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I see in them [moose, cat, chickadee, prairie-dog . . .] and myself the same old law.
        —Leaves of Grass (1855)
The underlying AssuMpTion deeply engrained within a culture 
that uses alphabetic systems is that letters do not relate to the material 
earth. They are immaterial, existing in the mind, and they are therefore 
disembodied. The theorist Brian Rotman exposes this assumption well 
in his 2008 Becoming Beside Ourselves. “Letters,” for him, are “in no way 
iconic.” Moreover, they have “no relation to that of the body,” and even 
the sounds we speak—the “minimal hearable fragments”—are “absent 
any trace of the sense-making apparatus of the body producing them.”1 
Rotman’s project explores how digital technologies, ubiquitously avail-
able to people, change this bias. Increasingly, we look at the materiality 
of images, graphs, web-based texts, and words rather than through 
them, to echo Richard Lanham’s phraseology.2 Rotman, though—and 
here is my departure point—overlooks the fact that letters can be iconic. 
They can gesture in written form, and when the letters compel someone 
to utter a sound, those “minimal hearable fragments” are not devoid 
of but rather replete with traces of the “sense-making apparatus of the 
body producing them.” This is why in “A Song of the Rolling Earth” 
Walt Whitman can say “in the best poems re-appears the body”—and 
not just the human body.3
At first glance, alphabetic systems do not seem to resonate with, to 
use David Abram’s phrase, the “animate world”: the “life [that] swells 
within and unfolds around us.” Abram seeks “a new way of speaking 
. . . that enacts our interbeing with the earth rather than blinding us to 
it. . . . a style of speech that opens our sense to the sensuous in all its 
multiform strangeness.” An even greater challenge is for written language 
to emphasize our “interbeing” with the animate world. For Abram, 
ideogrammatic systems more readily exhibit the animate, sensuous 
earth than alphabetic systems, for they often “borrow their shapes . . . 
from elements in the surrounding landscape.”4 However, in Spell of 
the Sensuous, Abram reminds us that the origin of alphabetic systems 
also involves a “pictographic inheritance.” The Hebrew word for what 
2became the English M is the same Hebrew word for Water—and we 
still see the ripple effect along the top of the lowercase m. Likewise, 
the Hebrew word for what became the English Q is the same Hebrew 
word for Monkey, and the Hebrew word for what became A is the same 
Hebrew word for Ox.5 Turning the A upside-down exposes the ox’s 
two horns, and I cannot help but see the tail swinging to and fro in 
a Q—especially in italicized Garamond.
The fact that A’s and Q’s once explicitly mimed oxen and monkeys 
points towards several questions. Do nonhuman animals still shape 
the form of writings within alphabetic systems? If so, where? Are they 
isolated cases?—widespread?
The dynamic where nonhuman animals shape the form of human 
writing pervades poetry and poetics in the long twentieth century, be-
ginning prominently with the century’s forerunner, Walt Whitman. I 
contend that many poets, including Whitman, discovered innovative 
breakthroughs in form through paying attention to the gestures and 
vocalizations of nonhuman animals. To substantiate these claims would 
take more space than this essay, but what follows is a gesture towards 
that direction.
In this essay I focus primarily on a subset within Abram’s “animate 
world”: just the animals. That is to say, I am more interested in the A 
and the Q than the m. Zoopoetics—a theory I introduce—recognizes 
that nonhuman animals (zoion) are makers (poiesis), and they have 
agency in that making.6 The etymology also suggests that when a poet 
undergoes the making process of poiesis in harmony with the gestures 
and vocalizations of nonhuman animals, a multispecies event occurs. 
It is a co-making. A joint venture. The two-fold foci of zoopoetics—
that nonhuman animals are makers and that this making has shaped 
the form of human poems—illuminates how animals animate even the 
“non-iconic” alphabetic systems of language, and therefore bring the 
sensuous world to the surface of the written page.
To give an architecture to zoopoetics in order to place it within 
the field of literary studies, I focus first on a theoretical context needed 
to rethink Whitman’s “original energy.” I place Abram’s insights in 
conversation with George Kennedy’s “A Hoot in the Dark,” Julia 
Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language, and Paul Shepard’s Thinking 
Animals: Animals and the Development of Human Intelligence. I draw on 
and extend their work in order to bring zoopoetics to clear focus. As 
the theoretical context unfolds, I hint at the intersections with Whit-
man. These intersections come to fruition in the final section of the 
essay where I explore the “original energy” of Whitman’s zoopoetics, 
particularly in “A Noiseless Patient Spider.” The exploration enables 
us to reassess the significance of “original energy.” Rather than be-
ing a monospecies event limited to human bodies, Whitman’s poetics 
3depends upon the bodily energy of locusts, spiders, eagles, and many 
more nonhuman makers. For Whitman, animal bodies reappear in 
some of his best poems, thereby animating the poetic micro-universe 
within alphabetic discourse.
Rhetorical Energy
From a 2010 vantage point, Diane Davis (who explores nonhuman 
rhetorics) claims that George Kennedy’s “A Hoot in the Dark: The 
Evolution of General Rhetoric” is a “seminal essay” that ought to have 
been “pathbreaking.”7 It was not, initially. Debra Hawhee shared the 
initial (non)reception of Kennedy’s work at a conference presentation 
she attended in 1993, a year after the publication of “A Hoot.” Ironi-
cally, the crowd generated enough rhetorical energy to communicate 
their unease, hesitation, and doubt of animal rhetoric: “There were 
whispers, sidelong glances, and muttering, all of which bespoke a slight 
panic about [Kennedy’s]—and the field’s direction.” Hawhee (and Da-
vis would agree) now sees Kennedy’s work as “timelier than ever” due 
to the rise in animal studies, ethology, and material/bodily rhetorics.8 
Kennedy’s driving thesis that “we [all animals] share a ‘deep’ universal 
rhetoric” is, indeed, much more palatable when we now have Donna 
Haraway’s theory of the “material-semiotic exchange” that occurs across 
species, particularly, for her, between humans and companion species. 
Haraway and her dog Cayenne sustain a dynamic rhetoric when they 
undergo agility sports, which becomes a “knot of species coshaping one 
another in layers of reciprocating complexity.” Through interspecies 
play, both human and dog experience an “ontological and semiotic 
invention.”9 Haraway, though, does not cite Kennedy’s “A Hoot.” But 
when she speaks of a “material-semiotic exchange,” she indirectly locates 
her ideas within what Kennedy envisioned. 
I return to Kennedy’s “A Hoot” over some of this more recent 
work for two reasons. First, Kennedy locates his theory within evolu-
tion in a very useful way, for “rhetorical energy” emerges from the fifth 
canon of rhetoric: delivery. In an evolutionary framework, “delivery,” 
he argues, “is prior” to the “traditional parts of rhetoric” that include 
invention, arrangement, style, and memory. Delivery, or rather, the 
“epideictic rhetoric” of showing forth through a bodily poetics occurs 
not just among human animals, but many other species as well. Kennedy 
places this insight within a taxonomic trope. He looks for some “start-
ing point from which [rhetoric] . . . culturally evolved,” and he begins 
“to define a ‘genus’ of which the various historical meanings of rhetoric 
are ‘species.’”10 The material and bodily energy of animals, including 
humans, involves the fifth canon of rhetoric (delivery), and it becomes 
the common genus shared across species lines, making intra- and in-
4terspecies “material-semiotic exchanges” an everyday experience.11 As 
I will argue, Kennedy’s theory of a multispecies “rhetorical energy” is 
consanguineous with Whitman’s “original energy.”
Second, Kennedy opens space to shift the focus from animal rheto-
rics to animal poetics, for he hesitates in his argument at a crucial point. 
I imagine that if the audience at his presentation heard him arguing 
for animal agency in conjunction with animal rhetorics, many may have 
walked out. Kennedy sees “no doubt that animals communicate among 
their own species and with other species,” but he balks to go further: 
“what is in doubt is the extent of their intentionality and consciousness 
of sending and receiving messages.”12 Animal rhetoric is therefore rela-
tively safe in comparison to zoopoetics, which assumes agency through 
its emphasis on making. Today, enough work exists within ethology and 
animal studies for humanists to become posthumanists. Many animals 
exhibit a conscious intention behind their material-semiotics as argued 
in works including Kevin Laland and Bennett Galef’s The Question of 
Animal Culture (2009), Sarah McFarland and Ryan Hediger’s Ani-
mals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration (2009), Chris Philo 
and Chris Wilbert’s Animal Spaces, Beastly Spaces: New Geographies of 
Human-Animal Relations (2000), and Haraway’s aforementioned When 
Species Meet (2008). From orca who teach their young how to collectively 
generate a wave to wash a seal off an ice floe to the rhetoric at work 
within bee hives, nonhuman animals demonstrate different degrees of 
agency. Concerning bees, we must not forget that Aristotle spent several 
pages articulating the “great complexity” within a hive, marveling at 
what could now be called intraspecies, material-semiotic exchanges.13
To extend Kennedy’s work, then, means exploring what happens 
when we suspend doubt concerning the agency of nonhuman animals.14 
We must flip the coin. On one side, we have rhetoric. On the other, we 
have poetics. As poetics comes from the Greek poiesis meaning to make, 
it already foregrounds a verb-ful agency, something that the term rhetoric 
leaves implicit. Nonhuman animals navigate innumerable rhetorical 
situations every day, reading the audience of another animal and crafting 
a text of gestures/vocalizations for that audience. When an animal crafts 
a gesture with a purpose for an audience, she or he becomes a maker. If 
Kennedy argues for a “universal rhetoric” shared by all animals, I sug-
gest a “universal poetics” based upon material gestures. This universal 
poetics encapsulates the first focus of zoopoetics: animals, including 
humans, have agency in a bodily poiesis that empowers the given animal 
to navigate rhetorical situations. Recognizing a universal bodily poiesis 
becomes a crucial step towards rethinking Whitman’s “original energy.”
To shift toward the second facet of zoopoetics—that nonhuman 
animals contribute to the making of poetry—requires a look at Julia 
Kristeva’s understanding of the revolution in twentieth-century poetry 
5and poetics. Doing so extends Abram’s insight, for we readily see how 
the animate world infuses not only ideogrammatic systems, but alpha-
betic systems as well.
Poetic Animality
Literary studies seem to have moved beyond Kristeva’s work, but her 
Revolution of Poetic Language provides a tremendous amount of explana-
tory power concerning what happened to poetry in the twentieth cen-
tury—something that began with Whitman. Like Kennedy, her theory 
rests on the premise that “preverbal gestures” always already “precede 
the positing of the static terms/symbols of [alphabetic] language.” 
The energy of the preverbal gesture enacts a “deluge of the signifier, 
which so inundates the symbolic order that it portends the latter’s dis-
solution in a dancing, singing, and poetic animality.” (This happens in 
uncanny places, such as the logo for Washington State University: the 
WSU exhibits a dramatic zoomorphism into a cougar in a deluge that 
overwhelms the letters.) To bolster her theory, she draws on psycholin-
guists who argue that the concrete operations of gestures “precede the 
acquisition of language, and organize the preverbal semiotic space.” All 
of this surrounds and helps articulate Kristeva’s theory of the inexpress-
ible, ineffable semiotic chora which, again, resonates with Kennedy’s 
notion of rhetorical energy, for it is the “discrete quantities of energy 
[that] move through the body [which are] always already involved in 
a semiotic process.”15
Part of her work highlights how the poetic revolution challenged 
the social and political order through the rupturing of language by the 
semiotic chora, but another emphasis encourages readers to relish in 
this energy:
Reading means giving up the lexical, syntactic, and semantic operation of deciphering, 
and instead retracing the path of their production. How many readers can do this? We 
read signifiers, weave traces, reproduce narratives, systems, and driftings, but never the 
dangerous and violent crucible of which these texts are only the evidence.16
Kristeva’s emphasis on the “dangerous and violent crucible” resonates 
with Abram’s theory of language. Though Abram draws on philosophers, 
he still acknowledges how poets infuse language with the animate world. 
He delivers the insight, though, within parentheses: “(Every poet is aware 
of this primordial depth in language. . .).”17 Kristeva’s theory suggests 
that the “primordial depth in language” is exactly what generates the 
“deluge of the signifier,” and she, like Abram, prompts readers to trace 
not signifiers but rather the vestiges of the pre-linguistic chora always 
buoying up even a written, alphabetic word.
6Even though Kristeva utilizes the trope of the animal to establish 
her theory—and I think of the phrase “poetic animality”—her work 
omits one crucial emphasis: actual nonhuman animals. To put it another 
way, it is one step to recognize the overwhelming presence of textual 
gestures within avant-garde poetics and to bestow those gestures with 
the animating power of animality. A second step involves taking seriously 
the notion that many other species also undergo their own participa-
tion within a preverbal chora. We know that subgroups within orca 
communities speak their own dialect. We also know that primates who 
have learned how to sign can horizontally (across peers) and vertically 
(across generations) transmit those coded gestures to initiates within 
their community. Nonhuman animal signs are, like human signs, al-
ways already buoyed up by a body in an act of poiesis. Kristeva’s trope, 
nonetheless, points us in a direction that further diffuses the arbitrary 
line dividing humans and other animals. A third step, though, requires 
tracing how the poiesis of nonhuman animals contributed to the “deluge 
of the signifier” characteristic of the poetic revolution. To do so, we 
must linger in the work of Paul Shepard’s Thinking Animals: Animals 
and the Development of Human Intelligence.
Minding Animals
Shepard laments the current mass extinction of many species for several 
reasons, but the one his work foregrounds is not the expected. A lack 
of animals depletes human intelligence. “My thesis,” Shepard states, 
“is that the mind and its organ, the brain, are in reality that part of us 
most dependent on the survival of animals.” He continues, “We are 
connected to animals . . . by sinews that link speech to rationality, in-
sight, intuition, and consciousness.” In order for human imagination, 
culture, and language to continue to flourish, we utterly depend upon 
what he calls minding animals—an experience many poets, including 
Whitman, have sought out. Shepard does not discount that other aspects 
of the more-than-human world shaped the emergence of language, but 
he focuses primarily upon animals, for the interspecies dynamics sur-
rounding prey and predator push animals to read signs: “hunter and 
hunted are engaged in an upward, reciprocal spiral of consciousness 
with its constituents of stratagem and insight.”18 Perhaps this is why 
Kennedy claims that “writing is prior to speech,”19 for human animals 
learned to read the etchings, markings, traces, scents, imprints, and 
tracks on the fabulous tablet of the earth—as well as the materiality of 
bodily poiesis evinced in the stalking wolf—prior to discovering ways 
to turn signs into speech. Shepard’s work allows us to see that natural 
selection encouraged animals to mind one another, read one another, 
and enter into what we now see as a material-semiotic exchange between 
7prey and predator, to use Haraway’s phrase again.
Shepard’s and Abram’s work complement one another. Shepard 
laments mass extinction of animals as it leads to a depletion of human 
intelligence. Abram does as well:
As technological civilization diminishes the biotic diversity of the earth, language itself 
is diminished. As there are fewer and fewer songbirds in the air, due to the destruc-
tion of their forests and wetlands, human speech loses more and more of its evocative 
power. For when we no longer hear the voices of warbler and wren, our own speaking 
can no longer be nourished by their cadences. . . . as we drive more and more of the 
land’s wild voices into the oblivion of extinction, our own languages become increas-
ingly impoverished and weightless, progressively emptied of their earthly resonance.20
Shepard also argues that nothing can replace minding a wild animal: 
“Neither pets nor zoos, books nor films can replace it.”21 It is no wonder 
that animals utterly pervade children’s stories and therefore the early 
stages of language acquisition (out of the hundreds of books I have 
read to my daughter, I can think of just a few that only have human 
characters)—but according to Shepard, we are mistaken if we think 
such simulacra replaces a child’s miming of a butterfly after chasing 
one through a field, or attempting a full-bodied growl or snarl after 
confronting a coyote. Provocatively, children’s yoga encourages a child’s 
minding of animals, for many poses such as the snake, the dog, the 
lion, and the turtle encourage children to participate in animal gestures 
and vocalizations. For Shepard, though, watching animal gestures on a 
yoga video may be a start, but it again does not replace living enmeshed 
within a reciprocal exchange of material signs with species whom the 
simulacra precedes.22
To bolster his argument, Shepard includes a non-exhaustive list 
of scores of animal infinitives still at work in our language, such as to 
bear, to quail, to badger, to scurry, to bug, to bullshit, to outfox, to growl, to 
skunk, to parrot, to duck, to wolf your food, to worm your way, to clam up, 
to horse around, to leapfrog.23 Such infinitives, pervasive through human 
discourse, demonstrate how the origin of language lies not in an Indo-
European root, but rather, in part, from minding an animal’s gestures, 
their ways of being, their vocalizations. Human ontology is bound up 
with animal ontology. For instance, many recognize the onomatopoetic 
dynamic within the word growl, but there is more. The diphthong of 
the “oowww” can encourage the mouth, lips, jaw, teeth to reenact the 
accompanying gesture out of which the vocalization arises. One does 
not merely make the sound of growling, but one’s face mimes it in its 
own moment of bodily poiesis. Much more could be said on Sir Paget’s 
“gesture-speech theory,” from which I draw, but that will have to wait.24
8Another similarity between Shepard and Abram is that both discuss 
the importance of minding birds. Shepard does so briefly,25 while Abram 
explores, at length, how the minding of birds shaped the language of the 
Koyukon Indians in the northwest of Alaska. The Koyukon people do 
not place human and other animal languages on a hierarchy but rather 
see the vocalizations and gestures transferring back and forth across 
species lines. Concerning bird calls, Abram highlights how, as a result 
of “listen[ing] attentively to subtle nuances and variations in the calls 
of birds,” their names for birds become “highly onomatopoeic.” When 
“speaking their names,” the language simultaneously “echo[es] their 
cries.” This dynamic epitomizes what Shepard calls minding animals, 
and because the process shaped language, it also epitomizes what I call 
zoopoetics. As Abram puts it, “the sounds and rhythms of the Koyukon 
language have been deeply nourished by these nonhuman voices.”26 
Abram and Shepard both expose how the interactions between 
humans and other animals profoundly shaped human intelligence, 
human language, and therefore human culture. My departure point, 
though, involves the recognition that this minding animals still occurs, 
at a profound level, within the tradition of American poetry. This is 
not to diminish, for instance, Abram’s work, for without exposing how 
birds influence the language and culture of the Koyukon people, we 
may not readily recognize the same dynamic within the work of E. E. 
Cummings, Elizabeth Bishop, Marianne Moore, William Carlos Wil-
liams, Wallace Stevens, Gary Snyder, W. S. Merwin, Brenda Hillman, 
Emily Dickinson, and Walt Whitman—to name a few. Indeed, the 
way in which the animate world infuses the language of the Koyukon 
people (through the minding of animals) also infuses the innovative 
discoveries of poetic form.
Original Energy
As mentioned, it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully articulate the 
zoopoetic dynamic within twentieth-century poetry and poetics. Here, 
I focus on the crucial forerunner, Walt Whitman. I see Whitman as 
that figure from chaos theory: a butterfly with powerful wings who sent 
swirls and eddies into the poetic atmosphere. Any study of twentieth-
century poetry and poetics cannot be complete without delving into 
the initial conditions of his work. Whitman’s innovative forms arose, 
in part, through minding animals, but before articulating this, I ad-
dress the perplexing question concerning why the zoopoetic dynamic 
has been overlooked within literary studies and Whitman scholarship.
To answer this question, I turn to Cary Wolfe, a leading scholar in 
both animal studies and posthumanism. In the introduction to Zoontolo-
9gies, Wolfe discusses “the radically changed place of the animal itself 
in areas outside the humanities,” and he argues that the “humanities 
are . . . now struggling to catch up.”27 In Animal Rites, Wolfe further 
elucidates the gap in humanist studies through the term “discourse of 
speciesism” which he defines as “a fundamental repression that under-
lies most discourse . . . taking it for granted that the subject is always 
already human.”28 This is precisely what happened with Whitman. 
Despite the mice, moose, geese, hawks, ants, frogs, snakes, oxen, spi-
ders, and eagles (to name a few) that populate Whitman’s oeuvre, they 
have received very little scholarly attention. In the 2010 article “‘As if 
the beasts spoke’: The animal/animist/animated Walt Whitman,” M. 
Jimmie Killingsworth notes that “the significance of animal speech 
in Leaves of Grass has been mostly overlooked in Whitman criticism,” 
and he points readers to Thomas Gannon’s other recent article.29 Kill-
ingsworth’s 2010 article begins to fill in the absence of animals in his 
earlier work. In Whitman’s Poetry of the Body from 1989, Killingsworth 
exemplifies the discourse of speciesism (which many of us have unknow-
ingly participated in at one time or another), for he does not explore 
a single nonhuman animal’s bodily poetics present within Whitman’s 
work. His discussion of the poetics of the human body advances the 
field, but other animals remain outside this discussion. The next step 
is to extend Killingsworth’s notion of “physical eloquence” to include 
nonhuman animals, and to see how such nonhuman bodily eloquence 
shaped Whitman’s poetry.30 
Returning to his 2010 article, “‘As if the beasts spoke’,” I highlight 
the need for the theory of zoopoetics. Killingsworth gravitates to the 
passage I include as the epigraph of this essay from the poem which 
eventually evolved into “Song of Myself”: “I see in them and myself 
the same old law” (LG 1855, 21). Killingsworth notes that the human 
barbaric Yawp and the Ya-honk of the geese are cross-stitched together 
through their similar sounds, and he concludes that Whitman, therefore, 
“refused to . . . reinforce the Great Chain of Being,”31 but there is more 
within the “same old law” to unpack.
In the context of a zoopoetics informed by Abram’s Spell of the 
Sensuous, Kennedy’s universal rhetorical energy, Kristeva’s deluge of 
the signifier, and Shepard’s minding animals, I clarify what “the same 
old law” refers to. Animals, including humans, are makers. In many 
instances, a few discussed below, Whitman minded animals, and when 
he did, he developed breakthroughs in his poetic form. The bodily po-
etics of animals (I focus on nonhuman), shaped the poetic gestures of 
the page, thereby contributing to the deluge of energy that inundates 
the signifier. And this is not a minor element within Whitman’s poet-
ics. In “A Backward Glance o’er Traveled Roads”—his prose piece 
concluding the 1892 edition of his tome—Whitman says “‘Leaves of 
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Grass’ is avowedly the song of Sex and Amativeness, and even Ani-
mality—though meanings that do not usually go along with those words are 
behind all, and will duly emerge” (LG 1892, 436, emphasis mine). I sug-
gest that Whitman’s “Animality” and the “same old law” refer to that 
“original energy” shared by all animals who undergo a bodily poiesis. 
“Original energy” is not a monospecies event for Whitman despite 
how many critics have limited that energy to the bodies of humans. All 
animals are zoopoetic, generating poetic energy through the illimitable 
gestures and vocalizations of their bodies. Of course, that well-known 
phrase, “original energy,” occurs within the 1860 Leaves of Grass. In 
all later editions, it remains and eventually migrates to the first section 
of “Song of Myself.”  And this leads me to my departure point from 
Cary Wolfe. The humanities overall may lag behind the radical revalu-
ation of animals in human culture, but the poets have not. Whitman’s 
multispecies “original energy” has been there all along, even, I suggest, 
as a prototype to Kennedy’s rhetorical energy. In “The Poet”—pub-
lished in 1844 and read by Whitman prior to the publication of Leaves 
of Grass—Ralph Waldo Emerson calls for a new poem: “For it is not 
metres, but a metre-making argument that makes a poem—a thought 
so passionate and alive that like the spirit of a plant or an animal it has 
an architecture of its own.”32 Much Whitman scholarship delves into 
the plants in Whitman’s poetic vision,33 but now it is time to uncover 
the animals. Emerson provides a seed for the second focus of zoopoet-
ics: the minding of an animal to such an extent that the architecture 
of a poem becomes revolutionized. And though I doubt Kristeva had 
Whitman in mind when she wrote Revolution in Poetic Language, we see 
that the energy of animal poiesis contributes to the deluge of the signifier 
in Whitman’s original architectures.
In many moments throughout his oeuvre, Whitman closely reads 
the bodily poetics of another species. For instance, in “Locusts and 
Katydids,” Whitman paid very close attention to the locust-song:
A single locust is now heard near noon from a tree two hundred feet off, as I write—a 
long whirring, continued, quite loud noise graded in distinct whirls, or swinging circles, 
increasing in strength and rapidity up to a certain point, and then a fluttering, quietly 
tapering fall. Each strain is continued from one to two minutes. The locust-song is 
very appropriate to the scene—gushes, has meaning, is masculine, is like some fine 
old wine, not sweet, but far better than sweet. . . . Let me say more about the song 
of the locust, even to repetition; a long, chromatic, tremulous crescendo, like a brass 
disk whirling round and round, emitting wave after wave of notes, beginning with a 
certain moderate beat or measure, rapidly increasing in speed and emphasis, reaching 
a point of great energy and significance, and then quickly and gracefully dropping 
down and out. Not the melody of the singing-bird—far from it; the common musi-
cian might think without melody, but surely having to the finer ear a harmony of its 
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own; monotonous—but what a swing there is in that brassy drone, round and round, 
cymballine—or like the whirling of brass quoits.34 
Here, we have not only a description of the locust-song, but also evidence 
of the second facet of zoopoetics: the rhythms, cadences, and sounds of 
the locust-song shaped Whitman’s prose. He uses many verbful adjec-
tives that, taken together, suggest an augmentation of energy: whirring, 
swinging, increasing, fluttering, tapering, whirling, emitting, beginning, in-
creasing, dropping, whirling. We notice, too, how the form of his prose—
the length of phrases and the energy within his sentences—likewise 
exhibits an increasing, whirling, swinging augmentation. Readers of this 
kind of sensuous language experience the immediacy of the animate 
world as nonhuman animals influence the form of a sentence—even a 
sentence within alphabetic discourse.35
Another instance further exposes the zoopoetic dynamic in Whit-
man’s oeuvre, “A Noiseless Patient Spider” (LG 1892, 343). Rather 
than seeing the spider merely as a trope for Whitman’s soul, I suggest 
that the impetus for the poem emerged from Whitman’s minding of a 
spider undergoing her own act of bodily poiesis: web-making.36 From 
this perspective, the poem hinges not on the turn to the soul in the 
second stanza, but rather on the line “It launch’d forth filament, fila-
ment, filament, out of itself.” The spider’s poiesis animates the poem on 
several layers of iconicity. Most obvious, perhaps, is the onomatopoetic 
effect of the five f sounds, the ffffffff of the thread launched into the 
“vacant vast surrounding.” A more involved reader, though, begins to 
mime this launching of the thread—mime, therefore, the bodily poiesis 
of the spider—gesturing with one’s arm and hand out toward the “va-
cant vast surrounding” in front of him or her. This insight leads to a 
third level of iconicity: the spatial/temporal dynamic both on the poetic 
page and in the empty space around the spider/reader. Because the line 
pulses with a dactylic beat (IT launched forth FILament, FILament, 
FILament, OUT of itSELF)—we expect the two soft beats following 
SELF. A patient reader pauses not only because of the line break, but 
because of the stillness generated by the absence of the soft beats. We 
then see the last f trailing off in this temporal pause into the “vacant 
vast surrounding” of the spatial poetic page at the end of the line break, 
and this coincides with the empty space around the spider/reader who 
launches (or mimes launching) the filaments. The audio/visual/bodily/
spatial/temporal iconicity allows the reader to experience vestiges of the 
poiesis of the actual, extratextual spider Whitman attentively engaged.
But that is not all. The dactylic pulses from “filament, filament, 
filament” augment throughout the poem. Much like the whirling, 
swinging, emitting, energy of the locust-song, the dactylic energy of the 
filament, filament, filament gives shape to harmonious iambic/dactylic/
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anapestic rhythms of three stresses in “the vacant vast surrounding” 
(iambic); “measureless oceans of space” (dactylic); “Till the bridge you 
will need be form’d” (anapestic); “till the ductile anchor hold” (anapes-
tic); “Till the gossamer thread you fling” (anapestic). This rhythm of 
threes (filament occurs three times; filament has three syllables; each 
phrase quoted has three strong beats; there are three till’s), manifests 
itself in the title and first line’s iambic trimeter “A Noiseless Patient 
Spider.” Whitman could have said “thread, thread, thread” or “silk, 
silk, silk”—but he selected filament, filament, filament. That constellation 
of repeated words becomes the starting point that shapes the rhythms 
throughout the entire poem, and I suggest that he chose that word 
through minding an actual spider who launched more than one or two 
threads. Consequently, this poem transcends the alphabetic system it 
begins in and becomes an ideogrammatic, material architecture where, 
to use Abram’s titular phrase, the spell of the sensuous readily surfaces.
When we take the bodily poiesis of a spider seriously—and when we 
realize that the spider is much more than a trope for the soul—we see 
how Whitman’s minding of a spider enabled him to achieve significant 
breakthroughs in poetic form, especially the interrelated constellations 
of iambs, dactyls, and anapests that all gyrate out of the iconic fffff of a 
spider launching a filament. “A Noiseless Patient Spider” is one of the 
best poems, for in it, the body of a spider re-appears.  
Zoopoetics, then, illuminates an overlooked dynamic within Whit-
man’s oeuvre, and there is more to explore. We could recast Whitman’s 
titles to be “I Sing the Eagles Electric,” thereby introducing a compara-
tive study of human bodily poiesis (“I Sing the Body Electric”) and that 
of the eagles (“The Dalliance of the Eagles”). “The Dalliance of the 
Eagles” also complements “A Noiseless Patient Spider,” for the eagles’ 
bodily poiesis happens in the same creative space as the spider: the 
“measureless oceans of [atmospheric] space.” The spider, the eagles, 
the locusts, and the human all follow the “same old law” of a poiesis 
emerging from the “original energy” of the body.
*
Like the Koyukon Indians whose language was shaped by bird songs, 
nonhuman animals shaped Whitman’s making of poems. Zoopoetics 
exposes the dynamic within Whitman’s oeuvre that, as mentioned, has 
been largely overlooked. Kennedy’s work on rhetorical energy, though, 
offers the insight that Whitman’s “original energy” includes all animals. 
It is, to use Kennedy’s category, the genus that includes all processes of 
poiesis. From the intense morphing of the mimic octopi to the kneading 
of a cat’s paws on a human thigh, animals are makers too. Within alpha-
betic systems, then, the micro-universe of poetry exists where a minding 
13
of animals pushes poets to innovatively create new architectures. Here, 
language is intensely iconic, thereby becoming a borderland between 
the human reader and the animal poiesis infused therein.
We must return, though, to the concern of Abram and Shepard, 
both of whom emphasize human dependence upon other animals for 
the nurturing of human language, imagination, and culture. If Whit-
man did not mind locusts, spiders, eagles, and the innumerable other 
species populating his poetry and prose, the sensuous energy of his work 
would be diminished. I recognize that mass extinction effaces—and 
mass simulacra eclipses—animals, thereby diminishing our experi-
ences of interspecies interactions. Whitman’s vision set forth in “Song 
of Myself” involves teaching readers how to discover and make our 
own poems: “Stop this day and night with me and you shall possess 
the origin of all poems, . . . You shall not look through my eyes . . . nor 
take things from me” (LG 1892, 30). Minding animals contributes to 
our understanding of the “origin of all poems” and how we might enact 
Whitman’s educational imperative. However, once the eagles are gone, 
poems like “The Dalliance of the Eagles” will have no referent, and 
they will become their own elegiac simulacra for the species no longer 
animating new architectures within human language.
Washington State University
NOTES
1 Brian Rotman, Becoming Beside Ourselves: The Alphabet, Ghosts, and Distributed 
Human Being (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 3.
2 Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1993), 43.
3 Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1891-2), 176. Here-
after, LG. Available on the Walt Whitman Archive (whitmanarchive.org). 
4 David Abram, Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 2010), 3, 176.
5 David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-
Human World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996), 101. Hereafter, Spell. 
6 I have found only two uses of zoopoetics prior to mine. In The Animal that Therefore 
I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), Derrida mentions “Kafka’s vast zoopoetics” (6), but his usage refers to 
the abundance of animals in Kafka’s work. Chris White uses the phrase in his 2008 
dissertation “Animals, Technology, and the Zoopoetics of American Modernism,” 
(Pennsylvania State University, 2008), but chooses another phrase, “the uncanny 
zoology of modernism” in his publication that emerged from the dissertation. See 
“The Modern Magnetic Animal: As I Lay Dying and the Uncanny Zoology of Mod-
ernism,” Journal of Modern Literature 31:3 (Spring 2008): 81–101. White draws on 
notions of the magnetic, electric animal as well as the term zoosemiotics to diffuse the 
14
line between humans and other animals in Faulkner’s As I Lay Dying, while I draw on 
rhetorical theory to establish a bodily poetics shared by all animals in order to trace 
how such poetics contributed to the revolution of form within 20th-century poetics. 
In “Zoopoetics: A Look at Cummings, Merwin, & the Expanding Field of Ecocriti-
cism,” Humanimalia: A Journal of Human/Animal Interface Studies 3:2 (Spring 2012), 
I establish some initial thoughts on zoopoetics that this essay extends. 
7 Diane Davis, Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations (University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 155.
8 Debra Hawhee, “Toward a Bestial Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44:1 (2011), 
81, 82.
9 George A. Kennedy, “A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 25:1 (1992), 6. Hereafter, “Hoot.” Donna Haraway, When 
Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 206, 42, 232.
10 Kennedy, “Hoot,” 12, 5, 1.
11 See Kristen Abbey’s “Dog Theory,” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and 
Environment 17:4 (Autumn 2010), 777–780. Abbey provides a close reading of the 
innumerable, often overlooked, material signs exchanged between her greyhound and 
her before heading out for a walk. Her work provides another example of a nonhu-
man animal possessing agency in a bodily poiesis necessary to navigate the rhetorical 
situation.
12 Kennedy, “Hoot,” 6.
13 Aristotle, History of Animals, Books VII-X, trans. and ed. D. M. Balme (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 335, 333–369. Fascinatingly, Aristotle recognizes that 
many animals do not merely “hear sounds” but are able to “distinguish the differences 
between the signs” thereby making “learning and instruction, some from each other, 
some from humans” possible (215). The Greek word he uses for “signs” is semeion, 
the root for semiotics. More to the point, a search on the digital tool at perseus.tufts.
edu highlights how semeion—to use Tim McGee’s phrase from our email exchange on 
this subject—“looms large” in Book 1, Chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, and it occurs 
sixty-two times throughout Rhetoric as a whole. Was Aristotle a proto-posthumanist? 
Regardless of how one answers that question, Aristotle saw an intra- and interspecies 
rhetoric at work founded on an animal’s ability to make and read signs.
14 When I discuss zoopoetics with colleagues, I often receive the hesitant “but isn’t 
attributing agency to nonhuman animals a form of anthropomorphism?” Several other 
thinkers in animal studies have addressed this question at length. Anthropomorphism 
is only a fallacy when we are staunch humanists. If continuity, rather than stark divide, 
informs how we see humans and other animals, then we need anthropomorphisms 
and zoomorphisms (attributing animal characteristics to humans) in order to under-
stand that continuity. Greg Garrard distinguishes between a “critical” and a “crude” 
anthropomorphism in Ecocriticism, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 160; 
hereafter, Ecocriticism. Philo and Wilbert call for a “guarded anthropomorphism” in 
Animal Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-Animal Relations (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 19–20. Such terms open space to explore the continuity between 
all animals in a field hesitant to become posthuman.
15 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984), 122–23, 79 italics added, 27, 25. Hereafter, Revo-
lution.
15
16 Kristeva, Revolution, 102–103.
17 Abram, Spell, 145. I find it strange Abram places parentheses around what could 
easily be a book. A sub-argument running through my approach to zoopoetics involves 
seeing the poet on the same plane as the philosopher, theorist, and rhetorician. When 
one needs credibility within Animal Studies, she or he cites the philosophers, theorists, 
ethologists, and rhetoricians much more readily than the poet. It is this gap my work 
aims to fill—though I recognize that my reading of Whitman, to gain credibility, needs 
the rhetoricians and theorists to open space.
18 Paul Shepard, Thinking Animals: Animals and the Development of Human Intelligence 
(New York: Viking Press, 1978), 2, 6–7. Hereafter, Thinking Animals. 
19 Kennedy, “Hoot,” 13.
20 Abram, Spell, 86.
21 Shepard, Thinking Animals, 249.
22 Greg Garrard applies Jean Baudrillard’s well-known theory of simulacra to eco-
criticism (Ecocriticism, 190–193). I cite Garrard’s application over the original source 
because Garrard emphasizes the unnerving implications when simulacra precede and 
eclipse all that interacts within depleting ecosystems.
23 Shepard, Thinking Animals, 27.
24 In “Language as Sensuous Action: Sir Richard Paget, Kenneth Burke, and 
Gesture-Speech Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92: 4 (November 2006), 331–354, 
Hawhee traces the Darwin, Paget, Burke lineage concerning the body’s presence within 
language, and as she does so, she recapitulates Sir Paget’s theory set forth in Human 
Speech: Some Observations, Experiments, and Conclusions as to the Nature, Origin, Purpose 
and Possible Improvement of Human Speech (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 
1930). In short, Paget argues that the mouth, lips, tongue, and jaw unconsciously 
mimed the gestures of the hands. Over time, hand gestures migrated to the region of 
the mouth. Speech arose when breath passed through a gesturing mouth while the 
hands were busy. In hundreds of roots within and beyond the Indo-European, Paget 
exposes how the motions of a speaking mouth correspond to the gestures/actions of 
the body (Paget 140–145). And so, when we say “hither,” our tongue still mimes the 
gesture of waving someone to come hither (138). When we say spit or spew, our lips 
still mime the actual action/gesture of spitting and spewing (153). To be clear, this 
is not “onomatopoeia” but rather what Paget calls a “pantomimic gesture” of the 
mouth (174). I cannot say whether Paget’s theory is the theory concerning the origin 
of language, but it articulates a contributing influence. Poets have routinely exploited 
this pantomimic effect. When we say could twist the sinews of thy heart, our jaw and 
cheeks mime the twisting action of the hands twice: once with twist and once with 
the first syllable of sinews. William Blake, therefore, demonstrates how the sensuous 
world animates the language of alphabetic systems, but it takes Paget’s gesture-speech 
theory to illuminate the origins of this pantomimic effect.
25 Shepard, Thinking Animals, 34–35.
26 Abram, Spell, 145–153; 146, 147.
27 Cary Wolfe, Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2003), xi.
16
28 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthu-
manist Theory (University of Chicago Press, 2003), 1.
29 M. Jimmie Killingsworth, “‘As if the beasts spoke’: The animal/animist/animated 
Walt Whitman,”  Walt Whitman Quarterly Review 28:1–2 (Summer/Fall 2010), 35n5, 
hereafter, “‘As if the beasts spoke’”; Thomas C. Gannon, “Complaints from the Spotted 
Hawk: Flights and Feathers in Whitman’s 1855 Leaves of Grass,” in Leaves of Grass: 
The Sesquicentennial Essays, ed. Susan Belasco, Ed Folsom, and Kenneth M. Price 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 141–178. My research uncovered an 
earlier, fascinating article by Edmond Reiss: “Whitman’s Debt to Animal Magnetism,” 
PMLA 78:1 (March 1963), 80–88. I surmise, though, that the reason why Reiss’s work 
did not generate more influence in the field is due to the lack of context for ideas such 
as animal magnetism. That said, Reiss’s work, coupled with Lippit’s Electric Animal: 
Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) has 
many synergetic possibilities for future discussions.
30 M. Jimmie Killingsworth, “Whitman’s Physical Eloquence,” in Walt Whitman: 
The Centennial Essays, ed. Ed Folsom (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1994), 68.
31 Killingsworth, “‘As if the beasts spoke’,” 22.
32 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Essential Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks 
Atkinson (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 290, emphasis mine.
33 For excellent reads on Whitman’s ecology of vegetation, specifically grass, see 
Killingsworth’s Walt Whitman and the Earth: A Study in Ecopoetics (Iowa City: Uni-
versity of Iowa Press, 2004) where he sees “This Compost” as “Whitman’s greatest 
contribution to the literature of ecology” (11); Jed Rasula’s This Compost: Ecological 
Imperatives in American Poetry (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), a perfor-
mative argument that uses Whitman’s ecological composting as a guiding trope; and 
Paul Outka’s “(De)composing Whitman,” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and 
Environment 12:1 (Winter 2005), 41–60, a thoroughgoing ecocritical read of “This 
Compost” and Whitman’s “proto-toxic consciousness” (56).
34 Walt Whitman, Complete Prose Works (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1892), 89. 
Available on the Walt Whitman Archive (whitmanarchive.org).
35 My first example highlights the zoopoetic dynamic in prose. Often, a writer with 
poetic sensibilities can accomplish what Whitman does here. I suggest, though, that 
the genre of poetry yields a more fruitful exploration of zoopoetics simply because 
many more variables (stanza breaks, line breaks, word breaks, expected musicality, 
etc.) create more flexibilities of form, making more space than prose to gesture within 
and through the limited alphabetic system of writing.
36 Readers may balk at the assumption that a spider possesses agency, but I see the 
other position—that a spider is nothing more than a programmed, instinct-driven 
machine who has no more sense of being-in-the-world than a stone (to echo Descartes 
and Heidegger) to be the absurd one. Greg Garrard provides glosses on Descartes and 
Heidegger’s positions (Ecocriticism, 28, 34), and Derrida deconstructs a philosophi-
cal tradition, which includes Descartes and Heidegger, in The Animal That Therefore 
I Am. I imagine that Tatiana—the Siberian tiger who escaped from her cage in the 
San Francisco zoo, tracked down the humans who taunted her, and killed one—pos-
sesses more agency than a spider (see McFarland and Hediger, Animals and Agency: 
An Interdisciplinary Exploration [Boston: Brill, 2009], 1). One may argue that making 
a web, for a spider, is an unconscious activity devoid of agency. Human gesticulations 
17
are unconscious as well, but as Kennedy’s work suggests, gesticulations in all of their 
unconscious movement still generate a tremendous amount of rhetorical energy. We 
often are impacted by the energy of gesticulations that buoy up a word rather than 
the word itself. I also point out that human makers rarely attribute their work solely 
to the conscious mind but recognize some inscrutable feedback loop between the 
unconscious and the conscious, the id and the ego, out of which their poiesis emerges. 
I cannot offer more than a non-scientific perspective on the agency spiders possess. 
For far too long, though, humanists have limited agency to humans alone rather than 
seeing a continuity of different degrees of agency throughout all species. And yet, 
Darwin (nor God, nor Darwin and God, whatever one’s perspective is) did not turn 
agency “off” for the arachnids, insects, amphibians, reptiles, and birds while leaving 
it “on” for the mammals. Differences between species are in degree, not kind. What 
Edgar Allan Poe said of his cat whom he watched figure out how to open a door holds 
true, in my mind, for any animal, like a spider, who must problem solve to one degree 
or another: “The line which demarcates the instinct of the brute creation from the 
boasted reason of man, is, beyond doubt, of the most shadowy and unsatisfactory 
character—a boundary line far more difficult to settle than even the North-Eastern 
or the Oregon” (477–478). I cannot help but see Poe’s trope of mapping. To overlay 
a bioregion with a political map is as disastrous as trying to impose a border between 
humans and all other animals. See Poe’s “Instinct vs. Reason—A Black Cat,” in 
Collected Works of Edgar Allan Poe, Tales and Sketches, 1831-1842, ed. T. O. Mabbott, 
volume 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 477–479.
